The State of Conflict Prevention in France by Fournier, Julie
The State of Conflict Prevention in France 
Abstract 
This article provides a quick oventiao of 
the state of conflictoprevention in  
France. It examines the origin of the 
debate, the role played by France in this 
field, and the obstacles hindering the 
development of an @ctive preventive 
diplomacy capability in Europe. Con- 
flict prevention is a relatively new dis- 
cussion in France that is fuelled by the 
frustrationfrom thefailure in the Yugo- 
slav crisis and the new focus ofthe gov- 
ernment to develop a new security 
architecture in Europe, mainly through 
the European Union. Current actions, 
however, already reveal the difficulties 
that impede the development of an e@- 
tive capacity of preventive diplomacy in 
Europe. Some of these dificulties result 
from the idea of prevention in general, 
while others are more specific to the situ- 
ation in France which is characterized 
by the absence of an official definition as 
well as by internal quarrels between 
academic, politicians and the milita y 
as to the potential and implementation 
of conflict prevention. However, the 
author argues that the critical perspec- 
tive proposed by French intellectuals 
and scientists could, in the long run, 
contribute to a more accurate under- 
standing of conflict prevention. 
Cet article fournit u n  r k s u d  succint de 
l'ktat oic en est la prhention de conflits 
en France. Zl examine l'origine du &bat, 
le r6le jod par la France duns ce secteur, 
et les obstacles restreignant le &lop- 
pement d'une diplomatie prhentive #- 
ficace en Europe. La question de la 
rkdution de conflit est u n  &bat, relati- 
vement nouveau en France, alimentk 
par lafrustration engendrke par l'kchec 
Julie Fournicr is a PhD Candidate at the Institut 
#Etudes ~olitiqucs, paris, ~rance. She has MA 
in Political Science, Law1 University, Quebec, 
Canada. 
Julie Fournier 
duns la h e  yougoslave et par l'atten- 
tion renouvelk port& par le gouverne- 
ment au dtveloppement d'une 
architecture nouvelle de la dcuritk en 
Europe, principalement via la Commu- 
nautk Europhne. Les actionsen cours, 
cependant, rMlent dkjh les difficultis 
entravant le ddzwloppement d'une capa- 
citkdediplomatie p r h t i v e  en Europe. 
Certaines de ces difficultks tiennent h ce 
qu'est l'idde de p r h t w n  en g M a l ,  
tandis que d'autres p rob lhs  sont plus 
particuliers h la situation hemgmle,  
qui se caractk.ise par l'absence d'une 
dkfinition officielle du phknomtne, 
autant que par un ensemble de querelles 
internes entre universitaires, politi- 
ques, et militaires sur les potentialitks et 
la mise en place de la p r h t w n  de con- 
flits. Malgrk tout, l'auteure prksente 
une argumentation selon laquelle la 
perspective critique, proposke sur la 
question par les intellectuels et les scien- 
tifiquesfranpis, pounait, h long terme, 
contribuer h une comprkhension plus 
adkquatede la question de la p r h t i o n  
de conjlits. 
Introduction 
In Western states as well as in intema- 
tional institutions, the concept of con- 
flict prevention is giving rise to 
increasing discussion and research. If 
the idea is not exactly new--sharing 
characteristics and linkages with the 
broader notion of conflict resolution- 
the tremendous changes provoked by 
the end of the Cold War give to the 
concept both a new meaning and new 
opportunities. Until recently, how- 
ever, the idea has been largely the pre- 
rogative of the Anglo-Saxon world, as 
the Francophone, and France, in par- 
ticular, have remained outside of the 
debate. Things are slowly changing as 
the Europeans begin to demonstrate a 
certain interest in the concept. During 
the last year or two, a few articles have 
been dedicated to conflict prevention 
and some conferences and workshops 
were organized among European se- 
curity organizations and within aca- 
demic circles. Particularly in France, 
various research institutes as well as 
governmental authorities have started 
to work on the idea. The goal of this 
short article is to draw a broad portrait 
of the state of conflict prevention in 
France. The origin of the interest mani- 
fested in the concept, France's role and 
initiatives in this area, and the many 
difficulties hindering the development 
of an effective preventive diplomacy 
strategy in Europe, will be briefly ex- 
amined. 
The Origin of $be Debate 
The renewed hiterest in conflict pre- 
vention in the international sphere 
looks to be maidy a conjunctural phe- 
nomenon. As Michael S. Lund ob- 
serves, four trends are at the origin of 
this evolution: 
.. . the emergence of a new, more co- 
operative intdmational milieu; the 
sobering experience of international 
intervention in already advanced 
conflicts; the prospect of more 
threats to intermational stability; and 
the growing economic and political 
constraints on governments' exercise 
of foreign policy.' 
France is no exception to this ten- 
dency. However, two additional fac- 
tors influence the growing interest in 
conflict prevention in France, namely, 
the particularly bitter feeling left in the 
wake of the Yugoslav conflict, and the 
Chirac government's recent priori- 
tizing of certahl policy directions in an 
effort to better define France's foreign 
policy. 
The unsuccessful measures 
lltunched by the international commu- 
nity to prevent or, at least, manage 
most of the post-Cold War conflicts, 
and in partidar the incapacity of in- 
ternational institutions to prevent the 
Yugoslav crisis and the genocide in 
Rwanda, provoked in France an im- 
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portant debate characterized by a 
strong sentiment of culpability. Mu- 
tual accusations among military, poli- 
cymakers and intellectuals (who, in 
this country, play a major role on the 
public scene), dominate the post-con- 
flict phase. In fact, politicians, scholars 
and the military are still analyzing the 
causes of the Yugoslav failure. The lat- 
ter two actors notably perceive the at- 
titude manifested by the politician% at 
the beginning of the Qonflict as having 
served as an incentive for the warlike 
policy of Slobodan hUilosevic, and as- 
sert that their procrastination is re- 
sponsible for the deterioration of the 
situation. However, in spite of these 
accusations, there is a general consen- 
sus that something better could haw 
been done to prevent the eruption of 
these two conflicts, in which France 
was strongly committed politically 
and militarily (being at one moment 
the main troop contributor in Bosnia). 
The assumption that some military as 
well as diplomatic measures could 
have been adopted in order to dis- 
suade the utilization of force has en- 
couraged the French to launch a 
brainstorming process on the notion of 
conflict prevention, and on the way it 
could be defined and implemented. 
This movement towards the devel- 
opment of the concept coincides with 
another important evolution on the 
international scene resulting from the 
end of the Cold War, namely the need 
to elaborate a new European security 
policy. France wishes to play a major 
role in this process following the orien- 
tation adopted by Fransois Mittermd 
which sought to make France, along 
with Germany, one of the major pillars 
of the European Union. The policy of 
the Chirac government, reminiscent of 
De Gaulle's conceptions, reflects a 
long-standing ambition to give to Eu- 
ropean states greater independence as 
regards the maintenance of peace on 
the continent. This approach coincides 
in France with the recent desire to re- 
structure the French Army as well as 
French foreign policy towards Africa. 
The achievement of these goals implies 
the strengthening of European secu- 
rity organizations such as the Western 
European Union (WEU) or the Euro- 
pean Union (EU)? as well as the devel- 
opment of a preventive diplomacy 
capability proper to Europe. In the Eu- 
ropean context of a rapid decline in 
defence spending and an important 
restructuring of national armed forces, 
this goal seems far from being reached. 
Nevertheless, France is strongly push- 
ing in that direction. The preceding 
trends determine the role and initia- 
tives taken by France in the field of 
conflict prevention. 
France's Role and Initiatives 
Although the idea of prevention is ar- 
ticulated and developed within the 
Council of Europe as well as in the 
Organization for Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe (OSCE), the idea is 
also discussed within the European 
Union where France has been one of its 
strongest supporters. Convinced of the 
need to define a new security structure 
for Europe, and confident that Europe 
has to build its own defence and secu- 
rity capacity mainly through exclu- 
sively European institutions such as 
the WEU or the EU, France is now try- 
ing to gather support for this idea and 
has proposed the creation of a Crisis 
Prevention Centre within the Euro- 
pean Union. 
Launched by former Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard and addressed to the 
European Parliament, the French ini- 
tiative seeks to establish a collective 
analysis unit within the EU that would 
work in conjunction with NGOs, uni- 
versities and research institutes, as 
well as with the United Nations and 
other regional organizations. The Cen- 
tre would be aimed at early political 
intervention through the collection of 
information, its analysis, and its com- 
munication to the European Parlia- 
ment. The European Parliament could 
then make recommendations on how 
it might intervene in a crisis, or launch 
various initiatives of political pressure, 
notably political condemnations or 
economic sanctions. The general objec- 
tive behind the project is clearly to 'I.. .
counter the political cost of ignoring 
warnings . .. and to replace general 
appeals by substantiated recornen- 
- - - 
dations for preventive action: 'There is 
this threat and, after appropriate 
analysis, we think this should be done 
and will cost . . .In3 In other words, the 
unit seeks to modify the actual 
decision-making procedure by pro- 
viding objective recommendations to 
political leaders. This procedure is cur- 
rently subject to evaluations by na- 
tional chanceries and the new 
procedure would minimize their influ- 
ence. Conceived to complement exist- , 
ing bodies involved in conflict 
prevention in the UN as well as in the 
OSCE, the Centre would, among other 
things, monitor countries in the area of 
human rights and detect situations 
that might constitute a threat to Euro- 
pean security. 
Yet while the project may appear 
valuable, its implementation is hin- 
dered by many obstacles. In fact, little 
progress has been made in the estab- 
lishment of the unit officially called the 
"European Union Analysis Centre for 
Active Crisis Prevention." The Union 
adopted a $1 million ECU budget in 
order to study the conditions for the 
creation of the Centre4 Nevertheless, 
it is still the object of a debate between 
the states of the Union and remains, for 
the moment, inoperative. The evasive- 
ness of the Maastricht Treaty (espe- 
cially of its Article 5): as well as the 
reluctance of certain countries (espe- 
cially the neutral members of the Un- 
ion) to engage their troops in military 
interventions, precludes significant 
progress. Actually, the more concrete 
initiative launched by the EU in the 
field of conflict prevention consists of a 
declaration concerning the will of the 
Union to develop an intervention ca- 
pability in conflicts occurring in Africa 
(DG8).6 
The Numerous and Persistent 
Obstacles 
Many obstacles impede the develop- 
ment of an effective capacity for pre- 
ventive diplomacy in Europe. While 
some of them are characteristic of the 
general problems raised by the concept 
of conflict prevention itself, others are 
specific to Europe or to the political 
situation existing in France. 
-- - - - - - 
I - 
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A large number of obstacles are ~ e -  
lated to the development of conflict 
prevention in general. In fact, consen- 
sus on this matter can be said to exist 
among scientists and diplomats, as has 
been observed and enunciated in vari- 
ous reports and essays carried out 
mainly by members of the Anglo- 
saxon community? In France, Maurice 
Bertrand, member of the UN Joint In- 
spection Unit, has been one of the first 
to address the problem, and has 
reached the same concl~sions.~ Spe- 
cifically, the main difficulties hamper- 
ing conflict prevention in general 
include the absence of a common defi- 
nition of the concept, the shortcomings 
existing in social and conflict theories, 
notably conceming the causes of war, 
and the gap that exists between intel- 
lectuals and practitioners. The success 
of preventive interventions is also de- 
pendent upon, as Maurice Bertrand 
and of what their contribution to this 
field should be. This historical context 
impedes the development of a cohe- 
sive European strategy in the field of 
conflict prevention. Europe's incapac- 
ity in this respect was revealed by its 
inertia in the face of the crisis that re- 
cently erupted in Albania. If the con- 
currence existing between the various 
European multilateral institutions 
constitutes an obstacle to a rapid inter- 
vention, the absence of a common 
vision represents an even more impor- 
tant difficulty. This issue, which has 
dramatic regional consequences, also 
has endogenous causes, as the debate 
existing in France illustrates. 
Aside from the general tendency, an 
important confusion prevails in France 
concerning the definition of conflict 
prevention and preventive diplomacy. 
As it is the case elsewhere and prirna- 
rily within the UN, the concepts tend 
Speci&ally, the main di@Zculties hampering conflict p r e v e n  in 
general include the absence of a common definition of the concept, 
the shortcomings existing in social and conflict theories, notably 
concerning the causes of war, and the gap that exists between 
intellectuals and practitioners. 
emphasizes rightly, the degree of co- 
operation between the conflicting par- 
ties, as well as on the political will of 
the states dominating the so called "in- 
ternational community." 
Alongside these general factors of 
obstruction stand other obstacles 
proper toEurope. The journey towards 
an effective preventive diplomacy ca- 
pability in the region is indeed hin- 
dered by the difficulties encountered 
in forging unity and establishing com- 
mon ground among political entities 
characterized by historical commit- 
ments to defend their ancestral tradi- 
tions and their national interests. In 
spite of the important evolutions on 
the continent since the last World War 
and the irreversible progress made to- 
ward the construction of Europe, Eu- 
ropean states (especially the more 
powerful of them) remain reluctant to 
cede part of their sovereignty, and still 
have different conceptions of security 
to encompass an excessive number of 
activities, ranking from classical diplo- 
macy to peace enforcement, and in- 
cluding also humanitarian aid and 
preventive peacekeeping missions. In 
contrast to some Anglo-Saxon experts 
who prefer a restrictive definition of 
prevention? the French continue to 
use abroad conception of the idea, and 
tend to be suspicious towards specific 
measures such as preventive peace- 
keeping deployment. While this type 
of intervention has been cited exces- 
sively by some as a very promising and 
useful tool in order to prevent violent 
conflicts, many French scholars as well 
as high levelmilitary officials are of the 
opinion that its potential is impossible 
to measure. They also suggest that 
political pressures seem more impor- 
tant than military means of conflict 
prevention. Furthermore, French ex- 
perts argue that even if violence 
erupts, military deployment will not 
beable to prevent further conflict esca- 
lation. 
In the same spirit, many French ex- 
parts and officials are reluctant to em- 
brace the idea of developing a rapid 
reection capability within the frame- 
work of the UN as proposed by a group 
of states under the chairmanship of the 
Netherlands and Canada. They assert 
thrat there already exists a rapid mobi- 
Wtion capacity of the armed forces 
wlthin developed states, citing their 
own country as an example. France can 
deploy within 48 hours an important 
and self-sufficient contingent for mul- 
tipurpose interventions. In their opin- 
ion, the creation of a rapid reaction 
capability unit in the UN raises not 
only important problems of command 
but also the very question of its man- 
date. Without a clear political direc- 
tion, the instrument could be the object 
of misuse. In summary, two elements 
characterize the French debate over 
conflict prevention: the relatively 
broad vision of the idea shared by in- 
tellectuals and officials, and the impor- 
tant infighting related to who should 
ad  in this field. 
Indeed, a broad conception of con- 
flict prevention dominates the French 
political scene. While international in- 
terventions related to this idea can 
have specific targets and objectives 
such as deploying troops to prevent an 
eixisting conflict from degenerating, or 
monitoring elections, the French seem 
tn insist rather on the long term dimen- 
sion of conflict prevention. According 
W this view, prevention is more than 
Simply an emergency intervention in- 
tended toprevent violence. Rather, it is 
deeply related to the social factors of 
conflict, and thus has to address the 
toots of international and internal dis- 
putes through a series of long-term 
and more diffuse instruments, such as 
economic consolidation and democ- 
racy building. This perspective is re- 
flected in the importance given by the 
French to the role that can be played by 
the European Union in this field, as 
well as in a concrete French initiative 
that gave birth to the European Pact on 
Stability. Concluded with the nations 
of the former Soviet block, it engages 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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them to resolve their disputes concem- 
ing minority problems through a dip- 
lomatic system of round-tables and 
treaties of mutual guarantees, which 
seems so far to work well. The French 
conception therefore implies that the 
notion of prevention has to be praac- 
tive rather than conservative. More 
than a simple act of diplomacy which 
in a sense tends to maintain the status 
quo, prevention has to be a "trans- 
formative action" looking forward to 
changing the existing international or- 
der. Instead of working on "actors," it 
should work on "situations."1° 
The French perspective, while mini- 
mizing the short-term aspect of con- 
flict prevention which is the more 
frequently used because of the inher- 
ized French society for many centuries. 
On the one side, different views exist 
between the military, intellectuals and 
NGOs concerning the meaning that 
should be given to the idea of preven- 
tion, the latter two segments being 
more ambitious and enthusiastic 
concerning the potential of the con- 
cept. The lack of reflection within the 
main French political parties or in the 
various state agencies worsens the dif- 
ficulties created by the absence of a co- 
herent vision. On the other side, 
quarrels exist among the military, the 
academics and the NGOs, each one 
looking to impose its view, as well as 
blaming the others for the failures en- 
countered so far in various situations. 
While the intellectuals denounce the 
More than a simple act of d ip~macy  which in a sense tends to main- 
tain the status quo, preve&n has to be a  t trans formative action" 
looking forward to changing the existing international order. Instead 
of working on "actors,7u it should work on "situations.77 
ent reluctance of the states to intervene 
in situations that do not seem urgentt or 
in which their national interests are not 
immediately threatened, suggeats 
nevertheless that more substantial ef- 
forts have to be givq to the study of 
conflict and especially to the factors 
and processes respomible for the erup 
tion of violence between different 
collectivities. Progress in this field de- 
pends, as specialists also have ob- 
served, on the links that can be 
established between intellectuals and 
practitioners, as one of the most sig- 
nificant difficulties related to conflSct 
prevention is the gap between social 
knowledge and action. This is particu- 
larly a problem in France which does 
not hesitate to speak out at an intema- 
tional action, but, in the end, often has 
problems translating its message into 
clear action. Therefore, even if French 
academics were to come to the ri&t 
conclusions regarding a conflict, the 
rhetoric may not necessarily translate 
into reality. 
Indeed, the French political and aca- 
demic arenas are dominated by sectar- 
ian views and parish-pump pplitics, 
illustrating a ttend W t  has character- 
inertia of the political leaders in vari- 
ous crises, the military accuses the in- 
tellectuals as well as the politicians of 
failing to back their strong words with 
action. They assert that they are not 
given the means and the necessary 
autonomy to realize their mission. 
Many NGO representatives also had 
the impression that they had been used 
to the detriment of their credibility and 
their impartiality in various situations. 
They uphold that the evasiveness of 
the statesmen forced them tonegotiate 
with war criminals and, in a sense, ren- 
dered their actions a contributing fac- 
tor to the extension of conflicts. 
Before it is able to take on the lead- 
ing role it desires in the development 
of a European capacity for preventive 
diplomacy, France will first have to 
overcome its own internal fights. Bet- 
ter relations among decision makers, 
intellectuals, the military, and practi- 
tioners are needed. These might come 
about through reinforced cooperation 
between governing authorities and re- 
search institutes interested in conflict 
theory, between the government and 
NGOs who have experience and are 
often the first to ad as well as the last to 
-- - - 
remain in a situation of conflict, and 
cooperation between the politicians 
and the military, if greater autonomy 
is granted to the latter. As these obser- 
vations reveal, decision makers are in- 
volved in every aspect of the question. 
Despite their current rhetoric concem- 
ing the importance of conflict preven- 
tion, they are still ignorant of the 
potential of the concept and reluctant 
to mobilize the will and the resources 
necessary to make the idea a, tangd.de 
reality. Therefore, important efforts to 
heighten their awareness must be 
launched by intellectuals and practi- 
tioners working in this field. While the 
broad definition of the concept and the 
infighting still prevailing may impede 
this process, the critical attitude 
adopted by many French intellectuals 
and high-level military officials can 
contribute, in a long-term perspective, 
to building a more accurate compre- 
hension of the concept and of its poten- 
tial, encouraging everyone to free 
themselves from a rhetoric that leads 
to nothing except the devaluation of 
the idea. Conflict prevention has to be 
understood as a usefulbut limited tool 
of intervention. The mixed success reg- 
istered so far in conflict prevention 
activities in Europe, and the important 
obstacles remaining before an efficient 
capability can emerge, show that the 
concept must not be used as a moral 
alibi by decision makers to conceal 
their idleness. Rather, its place is as a 
tool whose potential is to moderate. 
Conclusion 
If we can be pleased that European 
nations and France, in particular, have 
started to be interested in conflict pre- 
vention, we are forced to admit that an 
effective European capability in this 
field will remain elusive until four con- 
ditions are met. First, a better defini- Y 
tion of the concept is needed. Second, 
I 
the EU'S mandate in this field, along 
with that of other European security 
organizations, has to be clarified. As 
an incomparable cohesive force, the 
Union certainly has a role to play in 
preventing violence on the European 
continent. As amatter of fact, its attrac- 
tiveness seems to have contributed to 
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the success registered so far by some of 
the operations conducted by the 
OSCE.ll Its role might be effective in a 
long-term and more diffuse perspec- 
tive. Third, the development of a mili- 
tary capacity for ~ u r o k  is essential in 
order to bring a rapid response to pre- 
conflictual situations. So far, the ques- 
tion remains open. Finally, as &e of 
the pillars of Europe, France can influ- 
ence the debate positively if it is able to 
overcome its proper internal quar- 
rels. 
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